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Economics of the Independent Invention  
Defense under Incomplete Information
Murat C. Mungan*
Patents lead to ex post deadweight loss arising from a non-
competitive market structure for the invention. Many have 
argued that introducing independent invention as a defense 
(IID) to patent infringement can increase social welfare by 
decreasing such deadweight loss at the price of a modest 
decrease in the number of inventions. This paper considers 
the effects of IID in a setting where R&D firms have incom-
plete information about their rivals. Four main results follow 
under incomplete information: (i) fewer things are invented 
under an IID regime; (ii) IID’s effects on welfare are ambig- 
uous; (iii) IID is more likely to increase welfare if gains from 
competition in the product market are high; and (iv) deter-
mining precise conditions under which IID performs bet-
ter than the current regime requires access to data that are 
extremely hard to find and quantify.
I . I N T R O D U C T I O N
Patent protections enable potential inventors to benefit from their 
investments. Absent protections, inventors’ incentives would be un-
desirably low and retard technological progress. On the other hand, 
* Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, Florida State University, College of Law, 
425 W. Jefferson Street, Tallahassee, FL 32306. e-mail: mmungan@law.fsu.edu. I would 
like to thank Samson Vermont, the editor, and an anonymous referee for useful com-
ments and suggestions. The usual disclaimer applies.
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184 Economics of the Independent Invention Defense
rights conferred on inventors through patent law generate ex post 
costs arising from noncompetitive market dynamics. This use- 
creation trade-off is the focal point of many articles discussing po-
tential patent law reforms. A new and expanding branch of literature 
discusses the possibility of reforming patent law by making indepen-
dent invention a defense to patent infringement.1
An independent invention defense (IID) may take many forms. For 
purposes of this paper, it refers to any situation where an indepen-
dent inventor is allowed to use, sell or make the invention. In what 
follows, IID may refer to a legal regime where independent invention 
is allowed as a defense or the defense itself.2 I will call a legal regime 
which does not allow IID the current regime, and call the invention 
the product.
Those who advocate IID rely on the fact that it would reduce ex 
post deadweight losses.3 Most proponents of IID acknowledge the 
fact that the defense would likely suppress creation incentives but 
argue that this does not offset benefits from reducing deadweight 
losses.4 In this paper I investigate under what conditions IID propo-
nents’ claims hold by modeling the interactions between two R&D 
firms under IID and the current regime, and under complete and in-
complete information settings.
In Section II, I consider a very simple complete information frame-
work. Two R&D firms simultaneously choose whether or not to con-
duct research to invent a particular product. Firms that conduct re-
1 For a discussion of the independent invention defense and related issues, see P. 
Dasgupta and J. Stiglitz, Uncertainty, Industrial Structure, and the Speed of R&D, 11 
Bell J of Econ 1 (1980); M. La Manna, R. Macleod, and D. de Meza, The Case of Per-
missive Patents, 33 European Econ Rev 1427 (1989); S.M. Maurer and S. Scotchmer, 
Independent Invention Defence in Intellectual Property, 69 Economica 535 (2002); 
V. Denicolo and L.A. Franzoni, Patents, Secrets, and the First-Inventor Defense, 13 
J Econ & Mgmt Strategy 517 (2004); C. Shapiro, Prior User Rights, 96 AEA Papers & 
Proceed 92 (2006); C. Shapiro, Patent Reform: Aligning Reward and Contribution, 8 
Innovation Policy & Econ 111 (2007); M.A. Lemley, Should Patent Infringement Re-
quire Proof of Copying?, 105 Mich L Rev 1525 (2007); E. Henry, Runner-up Patents: 
Is Monopoly Inevitable?, 112 Scandinavian J Econ 417 (2010).
2 I will sometimes refer to the regime as the IID regime.
3 I refer to costs arising from noncompetitive market dynamics, collectively, as 
deadweight losses. These can be traditional deadweight losses arising from monopoly 
pricing, or others arising from the patentee’s reluctance to license its patent (as in 
Maurer and Scotchmer, 69 Economica 535 (cited in note 1)). There is another, ex ante, 
cost considered in this paper and in id, namely duplication of research costs. How-
ever, deadweight losses are the main concern of this and other papers in the litera-
ture, since their magnitude is likely to be greater.
4 Maurer and Scotchmer, 69 Economica 535 (cited in note 1) can be classified as 
arguing for weaker patents, but my paper abstracts from weaker patents’ negative ef-
fect on the level of innovation. This is because Maurer and Scotchmer assume that 
R&D investment is lump-sum and results in certain invention. Id.
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search invent the product with an interior probability. I capture the 
interactions between firms using a simple normal form game. Legal 
regimes (that is, IID and the current legal regime) are incorporated 
through their effects on firms’ rights in cases where both firms invent 
the product. By comparing equilibria under the two legal regimes, I 
identify conditions under which IID results in greater social welfare 
than does the current regime.
In Section III, I extend the analysis to incomplete information. The 
existence of different types of potential inventors is captured con-
veniently by assigning them different likelihoods of success. I incor-
porate this heterogeneity by considering a static Bayesian game. In 
this framework, R&D firms draw their probability of success from a 
known distribution of probabilities. Each firm acquires knowledge 
of its own probability of success, but not its rival’s. As with com-
plete information, legal regimes affect equilibria by providing differ-
ent rights in cases where both firms invent the product. I identify 
conditions under which IID is superior to the current regime.
In Section IV, I compare results obtained under the complete and 
incomplete information settings. Then I suggest a few topics for fu-
ture research and discuss the implications of the incomplete infor-
mation framework. The last portion of this section concludes. Math-
ematical proofs to all propositions found in Section III are contained 
in the Appendix.
I I . C O M p l E T E  I N f O R M a T I O N
Consider two firms, which may incur research and development ex-
penses of C in order to invent a new product with a probability of p. 
They make this decision simultaneously. The invention produces 
welfare Wm under the current regime and welfare Wd under IID.
5 Un-
der current law, if both firms are successful in inventing the prod-
uct, they are equally likely to be rewarded with a patent that grants 
payoff pm. A firm that fails to obtain a patent earns zero profit. In 
IID, on the other hand, if both firms are successful, both are entitled 
to market profits pd.6 I assume that (1/2)pm > pd > C.7
5 Wm and Wd include firms’ profits.
6 Conclusions would not change if the first and second firms were entitled to p1 > p2, 
respectively. In this case, pd would be the expected profits of a firm, which would be 
obtained by calculating a weighted average of p1 and p2.
7 The first inequality would follow in any reasonable model. If (1/2)pm < pd , then 
the single patent holder under current law can improve his profits by creating a sub-
sidiary and giving him rights that would be conferred to an independent inventor in 
an IID.
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186 Economics of the Independent Invention Defense
a. Nash Equilibria under Current law
Since decisions to engage in R&D are made simultaneously, interac-
tions among firms are best described by a simple normal form game. 
Let R denote a firm’s strategy to engage in research and R to refrain. 
Under current law, firms face the following game:
The pure Nash Equilibria of this game depend on the value of p. 
In particular the strategy profile {R, R} is the unique Nash Equilib-
rium iff
2( ( /2)) mp p Cπ- >            (1)
Inequality (1) holds if p is above a critical value, since the left-hand 
side of the inequality is increasing in p and attains its maximum at 
(1/2)pm, which is greater than C. This critical value is given by:
1 1 2
m
C
p
π
º - -
           
(2)
For intermediate values of p, equilibrium will be achieved where 
only a single firm engages in research. If, on the other hand, p is low, 
neither firm will conduct research. In other words, {R, R } and {R, R} 
will be equilibria if (C/pm ) < p < –p, and {R, R } will be the equilibrium 
if p < (C/pm ). These equilibria can be summarized as follows:8
8 If p = _p, the game has three Nash Equilibria, namely, all profiles except {R, R }. 
Similarly, when p = (C/pm ), all profiles except {R, R} are equilibria. In these excep-
tional cases I assume that parties will end up in an equilibrium involving the most 
research.
Table 1. Normal form Representation under Current law
Player 1/2 R (Research) R (No Research)
R (Research) {(p − (p²/2))πm − C}, {(p − (p²/2))πm − C} { pπm − C}, {0}
R (No Research) {0}, { pπm− C} {0}, {0}
Table 2. Equilibria under Current law
Equilibria Condition
{R, R} if   p ≥ –p
{R, R} and {R, R} if    –p > p ≥ (C/pm)
{R , R} if    (C/pm) > p
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B. Nash Equilibria under IID
Table 1 can easily be manipulated to represent firms’ interactions 
under the IID regime:
The analysis to determine Nash Equilibria under IID is very simi-
lar to that of the current regime. The only thing that changes is the 
critical value of p that determines the condition under which {R, R} 
is the unique pure strategy equilibrium of the game. This critical 
value, p, is implicitly defined by:
d mπ π+ - =2 (1 )p p p C           (3)
To verify the existence and uniqueness of p, let z(p) ≡ p²pd + 
p(1 − p)pm. It follows that z is concave, z(0) = 0, and z(1) = pd. This 
implies that there exists a unique and interior p such that 0 < z(p) = 
C < pd, and z(p) > C for all p  (p,1]. The equilibria under IID can be 
summarized by replacing _p with p in Table 2:
C. Comparing Regimes
To compare regimes, it will be useful to identify the relation be-
tween _p and p. Note that z is increasing for all p < p. This observa-
tion, coupled with the fact that z(p) is smaller than the left hand 
side of inequality (1) for all positive p, implies that p >_p. Having 
determined the relationship between _p and p, Tables 2 and 4 can be 
combined to compare the effects of legal regimes:
Table 3. Normal form Representation under IID
Player 1/2 R (Research) R (No Research)
R (Research) { p2 πd + p(1 − p)πm − C}, { p2 πd + p(1 − p)πm − C} { pπm − C}, {0}
R (No Research) {0}, { pπm − C} {0}, {0}
Table 4. Equilibria under IID
Equilibria Condition
{R, R} if    p ≥ p
{R, R} and {R, R} if    p > p ≥ (C/pm)
{R , R} if    (C/pm) > p
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188 Economics of the Independent Invention Defense
Table 5 shows that equilibria under the two legal regimes differ from 
each other only when p is intermediate (that is, p  [_p, p)). Here, 
both firms conduct research under the current regime, but a single 
firm conducts research under IID. This result follows from the fact 
that firms prefer monopoly profits half the time over duopoly profits 
all the time (that is, (pm/2) > pd). Since (pm/2) > pd the current regime 
leads to greater expected payoffs in cases where both firms conduct 
research. Therefore, the current regime incentivizes both firms to 
conduct research in cases where p is only intermediate, whereas 
only one firm conducts research under IID. This result is summa-
rized by the following observation.9
Observation 1: Research by multiple firms is observed less fre-
quently under IID, implying that fewer things are invented.
This observation alone, however, does not let us draw conclusions 
concerning IID’s welfare effects. While IID reduces the number of 
inventions it also leads to (i) lower research costs and (ii) higher 
surplus in the product market when both firms invent the product. 
Whether gains from an IID regime offset its costs will depend on a 
number of conditions, which are explored next.
In evaluating the desirability of IID, define social welfare as the 
sum of firms’ profits and consumer surplus (Wm or Wd) minus costs 
incurred for research (C). Let VN and VD denote social welfare under 
the current regime and IID, respectively. To identify IID’s welfare 
effects it is useful to categorize the probability of success, p, into 
four categories: (I) high (p > p), (II) intermediate (p > p > _p), III) low 
(_p > p ≥ (C/pm)), and IV) very low ((C/pm) > p).
9 Henry, Runner-up Patents, 112 Scandinavian J Econ 417 (cited in note 1), in 
Proposition 1, and Maurer and Scotchmer, 69 Economica 535 (cited in note 1), in 
Proposition 2, derive results similar to Observation 1.
Table 5. Comparison of Equilibria
Equilibria under 
IID
Equilibria under  
Current Regime
 
Condition
{R, R} {R, R} if   p ≥ p
{R, R} and {R, R} {R, R} if    p > p ≥ _p
{R, R} and {R, R} {R, R} and {R, R} if   _p > p ≥ (C/pm )
{R , R} {R , R} if   (C/pm ) > p
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1. High p
When p is high both firms conduct research in both regimes. How-
ever, social welfare is higher under IID because of reduced dead-
weight loss in the product market. The expected levels of social 
welfare are given by:
VN = (p2 + 2p(1 − p))Wm − 2C  and   
VD = p2Wd + 2p(1 − p)Wm − 2C       (4)
This implies that VD > VN because Wd > Wm.
2. Intermediate p
Under current law, Tables 2 and 4 imply that multiple firms engage 
in research when p is intermediate. However, under IID only one 
firm conducts research. In this case, the desirability of IID depends 
on several factors, which can be identified by comparing welfare 
under IID with the current regime:
V p p p W C and V pW C( 2 (1 )) 2N m D m= + - -       = -
2
  
Therefore, VN > VD if
p p W C(1 ) m- >        
Note that this condition may or may not be satisfied by intermedi-
ate p’s. To verify this claim consider two economies (1 and 2) where 
economy i is described by the list Ei = < Ci, pm, i Wm, i >. Other values 
that may distinguish economies are not included in the list because 
they do not affect the argument. Let
1 23,8,11 3,8, 40E and E= <   >      = <   >
Plugging in relevant values in (2) reveals that _p = (1/2) in both econo-
mies, which by definition is an intermediate probability. Hence, (6) 
holds at _p iff
/ ,mC W>¼
which is true for E2 but not for E1. Next, note that in E1, no interme-
diate probability satisfies (6), since 1/4 > p(1 − p) for all p. Finally, 
note that Wm does not have an upper bound. Therefore, for any range 
of intermediate probabilities, one can create an economy similar to 
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
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190 Economics of the Independent Invention Defense
E2, in which (6) is satisfied for all intermediate probabilities. In other 
words, the desirability of IID is ambiguous for intermediate prob-
abilities. This example also illustrates the importance of consumer 
surplus (Wm − pm) in determining the desirability of IID.
3. low and Very low p’s
The analysis of these two cases is rather straightforward and leads 
to the intuitive result that regimes do not affect welfare. When p is 
low, only a single firm conducts research under both regimes. Hence, 
VN = VD = pWm − C. When p is very low, neither firm conducts 
research, hence VN = VD = 0.
D. Summary of Results under Complete Information
The simple complete framework captures many intuitive results. 
These can be summarized as follows.10 
proposition 1: Under complete information: 
(i)  fewer things are invented in an IID regime;
(ii)  IID generates higher welfare for products that are likely to 
be invented once invested in (high p);
(iii)  for products with an intermediate likelihood of being 
invented (intermediate p), welfare effects are ambiguous 
and IID is likely to dominate if the cost of research (C) is 
close to the social value of the invention (Wm ); and
(iv)  for products with a low likelihood of being invented the 
current regime and IID produce the same results.
proof: Follows immediately from the discussion in Section IIC.
Proposition 1 suggests that IID is likely to dominate the current 
regime (weakly) if research costs are close to the social value of the 
product. When this condition does not hold, IID is likely to domi-
nate the current regime when applied to inventions that have a high 
likelihood of being invented.
10 Existing literature comes to conclusions similar to those summarized by Propo-
sition 1. See, for example, note 9. See also Henry, 112 Scandinavian J Econ 417 (cited 
in note 1), Proposition 2; and C. Shapiro, Prior User Rights, 96 AEA Papers & Proceed 
92 (2006), Theorem 1, acknowledging the ambiguity of the desirability of runner-up 
patents and prior user rights, respectively, and deriving parametric conditions under 
which they are desirable.
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I I I . I N C O M p l E T E  I N f O R M a T I O N
In this section, I construct a model in which two firms randomly 
draw their probabilities of inventing a product from a known dis-
tribution. After this draw, a firm learns its own probability of in-
venting the product but not its competitor’s. The first and second 
firms’ probabilities of success are denoted by p1 and p2, respectively. 
Unlike in the complete information case, pi {1, 2} are assumed to be 
random variables independently and identically distributed with 
density function f(.).11 Once pi {1, 2} are realized, each firm decides 
whether or not to conduct research. If firm i conducts research, it 
incurs a cost of C and succeeds with probability pi; otherwise it exits 
the game.12
Slightly manipulating Tables 1 and 3 enables us to identify firms’ 
expected payoffs given pi {1, 2} and their decisions concerning research:
11 Assuming lack of knowledge concerning the probability of success is only one 
way of incorporating incomplete information. This approach is a simple and intui-
tive way of capturing heterogeneities across firms in a single dimension. Heteroge-
neities across any relevant characteristic(s) would ultimately reflect a firm’s relative 
“advantage” or “disadvantage.” Accordingly, alternative specifications, for example 
where firms’ cost of conducting research differ, are likely to produce similar results. 
Collecting heterogeneities in a single dimension is not a novel idea; it has been used 
repeatedly in the incomplete information framework. See, for example, D.R. Deere, 
Bilateral Trading as an Efficient Auction over Time, 96 J Pol Econ 100(1988) (cap-
turing privately observable heterogeneities across firms through their productivity 
levels); D.P. Baron and R.B. Myerson, Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs, 
50 Econometrica 911 (1982) (modeling heterogeneities across firms through a single 
cost parameter).
12 An alternative model could consider probabilities of success, which depend 
on (i) investments made by the firm and (ii) an exogenous productivity parameter 
drawn from a known distribution. In this case, the analysis could be conducted in a 
very similar way by treating the productivity parameter as only privately observable. 
Such a model would produce qualitatively similar results, because the productivity 
parameter would collect all heterogeneity across firms and would reflect whether a 
particular firm has made a relatively good or bad draw. Quantitative results, on the 
other hand, would necessarily depend on the specific functional relationship between 
a firm’s probability of success, investments, and productivity parameter.
Table 6. Expected payoffs under Incomplete Information
Player 1/2 R (Research) R (No Research)
R (Research) {p1(1 − p2)πm + p1 p2 ρ − C}, {p2(1 − p1)πm + p1 p2 ρ − C} {p1πm − C}, {0}
R (No Research) {0}, {p2πm− C} {0}, {0}
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where
( ) d
m/2
if L D
L
if L N
π
ρ
π
        =
ì
=
í
        =
î
denotes profits when both inventors are successful as a function of 
the legal regime chosen, and L  {D, N} describes the legal regime 
where D is IID and N is the current regime.
Since neither firm knows the other firm’s probability of success, 
Table 6 cannot be used to determine the equilibrium. This lack of 
knowledge forces firms to base the decision whether or not to con-
duct research only on their own probability of success. To formalize 
this observation, consider the standard static Bayesian framework13 
and let ai  A={R, R } denote firm i’s choice to conduct research or to 
refrain. Next, let si(.):[0, 1] → A denote firm i’s strategy to conduct 
research based on its realized probability of success. Define ui as 
firm i’s expected payoff, which depends on its rival’s and its own 
choice of conducting research, and its realized probability of suc-
cess. That is ui = ui (aj, ai; pi), where j is the index for i’s rival. The 
values ui takes, given the legal regime, can easily be determined 
using Table 6:
=i     if a R
u p C      if a R and a R
p p p p      if a R and a Rπ ρ- + = =
= - = =
(1 )
0
i j m i j i j
i i m i jπ
ì
ï
í
ï
î
- C
a. Equilibrium properties
Given this notation, each firm seeks to maximize its expected prof-
its by choosing an action from A for every possible probability of 
success. The equilibrium consists of a strategy profile S* = (s1*, s2*) 
where si* solves:
1
0
max ( ( ), ; )f( )a i j j i i j pji A u s p a p p d
*
Î
 
ò
for all pi, and for all i  {1, 2}.
To characterize the solution of this game, note that a firm’s pay-
off, given the strategy of its potential rival, increases in its probabil-
ity of success regardless of the legal regime chosen. Accordingly, if 
13 The reader unfamiliar with static Bayesian games may consult R. Gibbons, 
Game Theory for Applied Economists, ch 3 (Princeton 1992). I use similar notation 
to Gibbons’, where si and ai represent, respectively, the strategy and action chosen by 
player i. In Gibbons’ framework, pi would be called player i’s type and denoted by ti.
(9)
(10)
(11)
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a firm is prepared to continue research after drawing a probability 
of success pl, it will certainly continue research if it draws a higher 
probability ph > pl. A corollary of this observation is that any strategy 
that is a best response (to any other strategy) must be one where the 
firm continues research if and only if it draws a probability that is 
higher than some critical likelihood of success. This intuitive con-
jecture is verified and formalized by the following proposition:
proposition 2: Under both legal regimes, (i) given any strat-
egy chosen by firm j, firm i’s expected payoff from conducting 
research is increasing in pi, and (ii) accordingly, any equilib-
rium S*=(s1*, s2*) must consist of strategies of the form14
   ³R if p pi i
C
R otherwise
ìs p( )i i*  =
í
î
proof: See Appendix.
The intuition behind this result is best described by interpreting a 
high p draw as one that puts that firm in a relatively advantageous 
state: f(p) captures firms’ beliefs concerning their rivals’ unobserv-
able likelihood of inventing the product.15 A firm will guess that its 
rival will (not) conduct research if its rival has good (bad) character-
istics. Therefore, given f(p) a firm will have a belief concerning how 
frequently its rival will conduct research. By using this estimate a 
firm can calculate how high its probability of success pi
C must be for 
it to have positive expected payoffs from conducting research.
Absent further restrictions, there are infinitely many equilibria 
that satisfy Proposition 2. This follows from the fact that there can 
be asymmetric equilibria where the threshold probability for firm 1 
(p1
C) is close to zero, but the same for firm 2 (p2
C) is close to 1. This 
possibility not only creates unrealistic results but is hard to interpret. 
To avoid these problems, I focus on symmetric equilibria. This focus 
will allow me to compare two unique symmetric Bayesian Nash 
Equilibria, one where independent invention is allowed as a defense 
and one where it is not. I start by identifying the unique symmetric 
equilibria under both regimes using the following definitions.
14 I assume that indifferent firms always choose to continue research.
15 An implicit assumption is that firms do not reevaluate their beliefs concerning 
their rival’s type after learning their own types. See Section IV.C, discussing this as-
sumption.
(12)
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Definition 1: A strategy of the form
s p( )
C
i
i i
R if p p
R otherwise
ì
   ³
=
í
î
will be denoted as sp
c, and any symmetric strategy profile(sp
c, sp
c), 
will be denoted as Sp
c.
Before comparing the properties of symmetric equilibria under dif-
ferent legal regimes, it is worth formalizing the fact that in each 
regime there exists a unique symmetric equilibrium Sp
c, and that pC 
is interior:
proposition 3: In each legal regime, there is a unique sym-
metric Pure Strategy Bayesian Nash Equilibrium Sp
c, where pC 
 (0, 1).
proof: See Appendix.
B. Comparing Regimes
Having established the existence and uniqueness of symmetric equi-
libria under each regime, one can compare the properties of these 
two equilibria. Part (ii) of Proposition 2 and Definition 1 suggest that 
symmetric equilibria can be characterized by a single parameter, pC; 
that is, the threshold probability that determines whether or not 
firms conduct research. The difference between these two probabili-
ties under the two legal regimes will be crucial in identifying ben-
efits and costs that come with these regimes. The next proposition 
establishes a general relationship between these probabilities.
proposition 4: Let the symmetric equilibrium under the current 
legal regime and IID be denoted Sp
N and Sp
D, respectively. Then 
it follows that pN < pD.
proof: See Appendix.
An IID regime increases the threshold probability of success by re-
ducing expected profits from inventing the product. This result im-
plies that an IID regime leads to less research:
Corollary: Fewer things are invented in an IID regime.
However, fewer inventions do not necessarily mean less welfare. 
One benefit of IID is savings from research costs. A second obvi-
ous advantage of IID is less deadweight loss in the product mar-
ket. In general neither regime dominates the other, since welfare 
effects depend on the particular draw (p1, p2). One can, however, 
This content downloaded from 128.186.77.205 on Wed, 28 Jan 2015 12:12:54 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Murat C. Mungan 195
identify particular regions in p1 − p2 space that imply welfare gains 
(losses) from an IID regime. Figure 1 partitions the p1 − p2 space into 
nine areas according to the incentives provided to competing firms.
In determining the significance and meaning of areas I–IX, it is 
useful to identify welfare effects associated with these areas:
proposition 5: In an IID regime, social welfare is (i) higher in 
area I, (ii) lower in areas VII and VIII, and (iii) the same in 
areas V, VI, and IX. (iv) Absent further assumptions, welfare 
effects are ambiguous in areas II, III, and IV.
proof: See Appendix.
In area I, both firms conduct research under each regime. Hence, 
research costs are equal. If only a single firm invents the product, a 
monopoly emerges so that social benefits associated with the inven-
tion are equal in both regimes. However, when both firms invent 
the product, the IID regime obviously produces higher welfare, be-
cause of increased competition in the product market. Hence, IID 
produces higher expected social welfare in area I than the current 
regime.
 
figure 1. Welfare effects of IID
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In areas V and VI, a single firm conducts research under either 
regime. The result is a monopoly and the same social welfare in both 
cases. In area IX neither firm conducts research in either regime. 
The result is zero welfare in both cases.
In areas VII and VIII neither firm conducts research under an IID 
regime. However, one firm conducts research under the current 
regime. Under the current regime, by definition, firms engaging in 
research are doing so because they expect profits that exceed the 
cost of research. This implies that research is desirable, since social 
benefits from the invention are at least as great as the firm’s private 
profits that exceed the cost of research. Hence, IID leads to less wel-
fare than the current regime in these areas, because it eliminates 
desirable research.
In areas II and III, expected profits under IID are only high enough 
to incentivize a single firm, whereas the current regime leads to 
research by both firms. In the current regime, whether marginal 
benefits from the second firm’s research associated with a higher 
likelihood of invention are great enough to warrant their (research) 
costs is ambiguous. But when the first firm’s probability draw is 
close to 1, the second firm’s research efforts are certainly waste-
ful. This follows because the second firm incurs research costs, only 
to affect the probability of invention slightly, and without increas-
ing competition after the product is invented. Hence, areas II and 
III contain regions in which IID improves welfare. Moreover, IID 
results in higher welfare in the entirety of areas II and III when the 
difference between the invention’s social benefit and research costs 
is small. A sufficient condition for IID to dominate in these areas is 
provided and formalized in Proposition 6.
In area IV, neither firm conducts research in an IID regime, while 
both firms conduct research in the current regime. Absent further 
assumptions it is unclear whether the increased probability of inven-
tion due to the second firm’s research is worth its research costs. In 
general, IID is more likely to be desirable when the value of the 
invention is close to costs of research. This is formalized by the fol-
lowing proposition.
proposition 6: (i) Social welfare is higher under an IID regime 
in areas II and III if Wm < 4C, and (ii) there always exists e > 0  
such that when Wm = 2C + e IID results in higher welfare in 
area IV.
proof: See Appendix.
No global statement can be made about the desirability of IID com-
pared to the current regime, even when conditions in Proposition 6 
hold and ambiguities concerning welfare effects in individual areas 
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(I–IX) are eliminated. The reason is that aggregate welfare effects are 
given by a weighted average of the effects in individual areas. How-
ever, one may still speculate about the likely effects of switching to 
an IID regime by asking how industries’ properties affect weights 
and magnitudes in areas I–IX. More precisely,
proposition 7: If Wd is large enough, then IID dominates the 
current regime.
proof: See Appendix.
One immediate implication of Proposition 7 is that the magnitude 
of deadweight loss affects the desirability of IID. If increased compe-
tition eliminates large deadweight losses in the product market, IID 
improves welfare.
I V . D I S C U S S I O N ,  E X T E N S I O N S ,  a N D  
C O N C l U S I O N
In this section, I consider several extensions and identify a few impli-
cations that follow from the model. The final subsection concludes.
a. Comparison of Results under Incomplete Information and 
Complete Information
Comparing results in Sections II and III reveals two important dif-
ferences between results obtained under complete and incomplete 
information.
First, under complete information, it is relatively easy to identify 
when IID is beneficial. When our estimate of inventors’ probability of 
success is sufficiently high (that is, p ≥ p), IID is desirable. This con-
clusion cannot be reached under incomplete information, because 
firms’ expectations concerning their and their rivals’ likelihood of 
inventing the product are as important as their realized probabilities 
of success. Thus under incomplete information it is not possible to 
determine the desirability of IID by focusing on simple conditions 
based on firms’ estimated probabilities of success.
Second, under complete information, the magnitude of deadweight 
losses eliminated by competition in the product market (that is, 
Wd − Wm) plays no role in determining whether IID is beneficial. Since 
probabilities of success are observable, we can determine conditions 
based on these probabilities under which IID is beneficial. Note that 
none of these conditions depends on Wd.
16 Under incomplete infor-
mation, on the other hand, the size of Wd is a major determinant 
16 See Section II.C to verify this claim.
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in whether IID is beneficial.17 This follows from the fact that we do 
not know what incentives IID will provide to a given firm, because 
its probability of success is unobservable. We only have beliefs con-
cerning its probability of success. On the basis of these beliefs, we 
can only estimate how often firms will produce the product simul-
taneously under IID and generate welfare gains by increasing com-
petition in the product market. Because these benefits are increasing 
in Wd, they will offset costs generated by IID’s effects of decreasing 
incentives to invent only if Wd is sufficiently large.
18
According to this comparison, determining conditions for the 
desirability of IID is harder under incomplete information. In par-
ticular, firms’ beliefs about their and their rivals’ probabilities of 
inventing the product and the size of eliminated deadweight losses 
through the application of IID (that is, Wd − Wm) become important 
considerations.
B. Subsidies and Rewards
It is interesting to consider the effects of complementing IID with 
small subsidies or awards. Recall that the main costs of IID involve 
decreased incentives to produce (that is, pD > pN). This disincentive 
can be cured by subsidizing firms that engage in research. Further-
more, such subsidies have no direct effect on IID’s benefits, which 
come from increased competition in the ex post market for the in-
vention. Therefore, subsidies could, in theory, cure the defects of IID 
and leave its benefits untouched. One could potentially design an 
IID-plus-subsidies regime that would dominate the current regime. 
One would, however, have to address two main problems associated 
with subsidies. First, errors in the determination of appropriate sub-
sidies could be costly. If they are set too high, they will overincen-
tivize firms. If they are set too low, they will be insufficient to offset 
the undesirable effects of IID. Second, subsidies would require an 
increase in aggregate taxes, which would lead to deadweight losses. 
It is not clear whether welfare gains from switching to an IID-plus-
subsidies regime would offset these losses.
17 See Proposition 7.
18 What “sufficiently large” means can be calculated by evaluating welfare un-
der IID as a function of Wd, and evaluating welfare under the current regime. Since 
welfare under IID is increasing in Wd, one can find Wd*, the critical Wd that equalizes 
welfare under both regimes. Any Wd greater than Wd* would be sufficiently large.
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C. Independence of pi and f(pj )
The instant model assumes that each firm draws its probability of 
success from a known distribution f(.). A firm knows the likelihood 
with which it will get a good or a bad draw. Once it makes its draw, 
it attributes its particular probability of success to exogenous factors 
associated with the firm’s own and unique properties. Accordingly, 
after it draws its probability of success (pi), it does not reevaluate 
its beliefs concerning the distribution from which its opponent will 
make its draw (f(pj)); that is, firm i’s estimate of f(pj) is independent 
of pi.
The reasonableness of this assumption is an empirical question 
whose answer depends on the product to be invented. For that rea-
son, an extension analyzing the effects of relaxing this assumption 
may prove useful. In particular, f(.), which represents the identical 
and independent distributions of pi and pj, can be replaced with a 
joint probability distribution to capture correlations between a 
firm’s own draw and its expectations concerning its rival’s draw.
D. Endogenous Determination of the Number of players
This paper focuses on the case where two rivals decide whether or 
not to invest in research. Future extensions can allow the number 
of players to be endogenously determined, by considering a larger, 
two-period game. In period one, a number of firms decide whether 
or not to incur an initial investment cost of I. In period two, n firms 
who incurred the investment cost of I play the n player version of 
the game described in Section III. In this setting, firms would stop 
joining the second stage of the game when they estimate negative 
expected payoffs from doing so. That is, n would reflect the satia-
tion point of the research market for a particular invention. This 
extension would capture not only IID’s effect on a fixed number of 
firms’ incentives to conduct research, but also its effect on altering 
the number of firms interested in R&D in the first place. The latter 
effect will link welfare to changes in aggregate research costs and 
the aggregate probability of invention.
E. Conclusion
I have shown that IID’s effects on welfare are ambiguous under in-
complete information. I then identified particular conditions un-
der which IID is likely to perform better than the current regime, 
and pointed out that these conditions are more complex than they 
would be in a complete information setting. Verifying whether these 
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conditions are met in reality requires access to information that 
would be extremely hard to find and quantify, including information 
concerning R&D firms’ expectations regarding their and their rivals’ 
likelihood of inventing a product, the social value of the product 
sought to be invented, deadweight losses arising from the noncom-
petitive market structure for a patented product, research costs, and 
private benefits to successful firms under both the current regime 
and IID. It therefore seems unlikely that one can accurately deter-
mine whether switching to an IID regime would increase welfare.
a p p E N D I X
proof of proposition 2: (i) Let Z={ q  [0,1] such that sj (q)=R} and 
let Z = [0,1]\Z.
Then, given any strategy sj, firm i’s expected utility from conduct-
ing research is given by:
( , ) ( , ; ) ( ) ( , ; ) ( )i j i i i j j i i j j
p Z p Zj j
V s p u R R p f p dp u R R p f p dp
Î Î
=   +   
ò ò
plugging in the corresponding values for ui as defined in (10), we 
have:
V s p p p p p f p dp p f p dp( , ) [ (1 ) ] ( ) ( )i j i i j m i j j j i m j j
ò òp Z p Zj j
π ρ π
Î Î
- + +=
It follows that in (A.2) both integrands and therefore Vi are increas-
ing in pi.
(ii) Follows trivially from part (i). Q.E.D.
proof of proposition 3: Proposition 2 establishes that any equilib-
rium must be of the form S=(spc, sqc). Symmetry requires that pC = qC, 
in which case S is denoted as Sp
c. A symmetric strategy profile Sp
c is 
an equilibrium profile iff
( , ) ( ( ), ; ) ( ) 0³ =i p i i p j i j jV s p u s p R p f p dp
1
0
c
ò
c
for all pi ≥ pc and 
( , ) ( ( ), ; ) ( ) 0i p i i p j i j j< =V s p u s  p R p f p dp
1
0
c
ò
 
c
for all pi < pc, where Vi is firm i’s expected utility from conducting 
research.
This follows, because (i) (A.3) and (A.4) imply that sp
c is a best 
response to sp
c and (ii) whenever firms’ strategies are best responses 
to each other we have an equilibrium.
(A.1)
(A.2)
(A.3)
(A.4)
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But part (i) of proposition 2 implies that (A.3) and (A.4) hold iff 
Vi(sp
c, pc)=0, which is equivalent to
+ - + =
1
0
( ) (1 ) ] ( )
cp c
c m j j c j m j j jcp
p f p dp p p p p f p dp Cπ π ρ
ò ò
[
To see this, note that Z as referred to in (A.2) is equal to [pC, 1] when 
sj = spc, and replace pi in (A.2) with pc. To demonstrate existence and 
uniqueness it will be convenient to define the left-hand side of (A.5) 
as a function of pc. Accordingly, let
1
0
( ) ( ) [ (1 ) ] ( )
cpc c c c
m j j j m j j jcp
g p p f p dp p p p p f p dpπ π ρ= + - +
ò ò
Differentiating g with respect to pC establishes the fact that g is 
increasing in pC:
  g F p p f p p p f p dpm m j m j j j
12( ) ( ) ( )( ) [(1 ) ] ( ) 0c c c cp p= + - + - + >π π ρ π ρò
 
  g F p p f p p p f p dpm m j m j j j
12( ) ( ) ( )( ) [(1 ) ] ( ) 0c c c cp p= + - + - + >π π ρ π ρò
where F(.) is the cumulative distribution function associated with 
f(.). To see how the inequality follows, note that the first and third 
terms are obviously positive. The second term is also positive since 
r < pm.
Next, note that 
    g Cand g C= <   = >(0) 0 (1) mπ
Hence, the intermediate value theorem applied to facts captured by 
(A.7) and (A.8) imply that there exists a unique and interior value 
of pC that satisfies (A.5). Q.E.D.
proof of proposition 4: (A.5) identifies the condition that pC must 
satisfy under both regimes. The value of pC that satisfies (A.5) 
depends on the legal regime only through the regime’s effect on r. 
Hence, by applying the implicit function theorem, the effects of an 
increase in r on pC can be determined:
 
= - = <
F p p f p p p f p dp+ - + - +
1
12
( )9
0
9 ( ) ( ) ( )( ) [(1 ) ] ( )
c j j jcp
c c c c
m m j m j j jcp
pc p f p dpp
ρ p
ρ
π π ρ π ρ
¶
¶
ò
ò
 
= - = <
F p p f p p p f p dp+ - + - +
1
12
( )9
0
9 ( ) ( ) ( )( ) [(1 ) ] ( )
c j j jcp
c c c c
m m j m j j jcp
pc p f p dpp
ρ p
ρ
π π ρ π ρ
¶
¶
ò
ò
(A.5)
(A.6)
(A.7)
(A.8)
(A.9)
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Next, recall that
  ( ) ( )
2
m
dD N
π
ρ π ρ= < =
Hence, 
     
D Np p>
Q.E.D.
proof of proposition 5: The proof of parts (i) and (iii) follow imme-
diately from the explanations provided in Section III following the 
statement of Proposition 5.
(ii) Let pm = max{p1, p2}. At any point (p1, p2) that falls in areas 
VII or VIII, expected social welfare is 0 under IID and is given by 
pmWm − C under the current regime. But in these areas, it follows 
that pmpm > C, since firm m would not engage in research otherwise. 
Hence, pmWm – C > pmpm – C > 0, which implies that social welfare 
is higher under the current regime at any point that falls in areas 
VII or VIII.
(iv) Area IV: At any point (p1, p2) that falls in area IV, expected 
social welfare is 0 under an IID regime and [1 − (1 − p1)(1 − p2)]Wm − 
2C under the current regime. Hence, an IID regime results in higher 
welfare iff
  p p ]W C[1 (1 )(1 ) 2- - - <1 2 m
Next, note that 1 − (1 − p1)(1 − p2)<1 − (1 − pD)2= pD (2 − pD) for all (p1, 
p2) in area IV. Furthermore, p
D (2 − pD) is increasing in pD for all pD 
 [0,1). Accordingly, the left-hand side of (A.12) attains the highest 
possible value when p1 = p2 = pD and pD is as high as possible. But 
from the proof of Proposition 3 we know that pD < 1. Hence, the 
highest value the left-hand side of (A.12) can take is lower than 
Wm. Therefore, it follows that there exists e > 0 such that Wm = 2C 
+ e implies that (A.12) holds for all (p1, p2) in area IV. Finally, note 
that Wm does not have an upper bound, and if it is sufficiently high, 
(A.12) does not hold for any (p1, p2) in area IV. Accordingly, welfare 
effects are ambiguous in area IV.
Areas II and III: At any point (p1, p2) that falls in area II, expected 
social welfare is p2Wm − C under an IID regime and [1 − (1 − p1) 
(1 − p2)]Wm − 2C under the current regime. Hence, an IID regime 
results in higher welfare iff
 1 2(1 ) mC p p W> -
 
(A.11)
(A.12)
(A.13)
(A.10)
This content downloaded from 128.186.77.205 on Wed, 28 Jan 2015 12:12:54 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Murat C. Mungan 203
Next, note that pD (1 − pD) > p1 (1 − p2) for all (p1, p2) in area II. Hence, 
IID is more desirable at any point in area II if
 (1 )D D mC p p W> -
But the maximum value of pD(1 − pD) is 0.25. Accordingly, if Wm 
< 4C, it follows that IID leads to higher welfare in the entirety of 
area II. Finally, note that Wm does not have an upper bound, and if 
it is sufficiently high IID will be inferior in all points in this area. 
Hence, IID’s welfare effects in this area are ambiguous. 
The same conclusion holds for area III, because of the symmetry 
between areas II and III. Q.E.D.
proof of proposition 6: Both parts are proven in the proof of Proposi-
tion 4 part (iv).
proof of proposition 7: The claim follows from the fact that Wd 
affects only the gains from IID in area I, and does not affect firms’ 
incentives. Hence, given any economy, there is a large enough Wd, 
such that social welfare is greater under IID than under the current 
regime. Q.E.D.
(A.14)
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